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Navy leadership is searching for ways to finance urgent fleet recapitalization 
despite severely limited resources.  This study exposes the enormity of the 
recapitalization challenge using budget forecasting and ratio analysis to frame potential 
trade-offs among major Navy appropriations that would achieve programmed 
procurement targets.  We illustrate the organizational and operational challenges 
associated with even small trade-offs and also examine the increasingly common practice 
of competitive sourcing using private-sector risk criteria popularized in business 
literature.   
Our research suggests that current recapitalization goals are financially untenable 
without significant Defense restructuring.  We show with a Marine Corps rescission 
example that implementing the trade-offs suggested by our analysis would challenge the 
very way DoD does business.  However, we find that the early success of Sea Enterprise 
in identifying business efficiencies offers the best promise for success.  We caution that 
competitive sourcing must not be purely cost-driven but rather a strategic approach to 
managing risk.  We offer perspectives and considerations beyond the outsourcing 
roadmap currently provided by OMB Circular A-76.  
This study is intended for Navy leaders and other stakeholders who are evaluating 
the factors constraining fleet re-capitalization, considering the practical ramifications of 
looming financing decisions, and weighing the strategic and operational risks of 
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I. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE 
Navy planners have identified the need to re-capitalize the fleet in preparation for 
a sustained war against global terrorism.  Specifically, this requirement includes a 
dramatic increase in shipbuilding and aircraft procurement over the next decade.  The 
challenge is that Navy total obligation authority (TOA) is not expected to increase over 
that same period, and may even decline under pressure from increasing non-discretionary 
spending in the federal budget.  Thus, Navy leaders are considering various alternatives 
to finance new procurement.  Financial efficiencies obtained through streamlining 
business processes may provide some resources.  More likely, Navy programmers will 
need to weigh difficult trade-offs among the various appropriations and shift resources to 
procurement from areas such as military personnel, operations and maintenance, 
research, and construction.  One consequence of this approach is that the Navy will 
outsource “non-core” capabilities funded by these latter appropriations.  Considering the 
costs and risks associated with outsourcing entire functions, the re-capitalization 
financing decisions are of critical importance to Navy mission readiness.   
A. OBJECTIVES 
Although the fleet re-capitalization problem has many facets, this research has 
three specific concentration areas.  The initial focus is to define in broad terms the nature 
and scope of potential budget trade-offs that achieve fleet re-capitalization goals within 
the framework of current Navy missions.  Second, the analysis explores in greater detail a 
Marine Corps manpower rescission that illustrates the significant ramifications of even a 
relatively small budget cut.  Finally, recognizing the inevitability of continued 
outsourcing in the Department of Defense (DoD), the study evaluates current outsourcing 
policy and initiatives using private-sector risk criteria popularized in the business 
literature.   
These focus areas target Navy leaders and other stakeholders seeking to 
understand the factors constraining fleet re-capitalization and to appreciate the difficult 
financing decisions ahead.  The study also outlines specific categories of strategic 
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outsourcing risk for consideration by all users of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) circular A-76.   
B. SOURCES OF DATA 
The study references several sources of public data.  Federal budget implications 
of entitlement spending trends are drawn from Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
forecasts.  Current editions of key planning documents provide the background and 
context for the Navy re-capitalization effort.  Specific procurement goals for ships and 
aircraft are projected in the Highlights of the fiscal year 2004 Department of Navy (DoN) 
Budget.  Program cost information and Navy TOA are taken from historical DON budget 
data for fiscal years 2000 through 2004.  Finally, Marine Corps manpower rescission 
options are framed using data taken from two studies conducted by RAND for the U.S. 
Army and from DoD manpower statistics for fiscal year 2000.   
C. ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY 
The analytical methods used in the research are ratio analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis.  First, DoN spending forecasts in various categories are compared directly using 
relative cost ratios.  In this way, we identify potential trade-offs that achieve procurement 
goals given constant top-line TOA.  Next, these alternatives are evaluated using cost-
benefit analysis in both the general case of fleet re-capitalization and the specific case of 
a Marine Corps manpower rescission.  Finally, the study presents a more qualitative 
comparison of outsourcing practices in DoD with the strategic cost-benefit considerations 
common in the private sector.   
D. LIMITATIONS 
As indicated, fleet re-capitalization will drive and shape nearly all financial 
decisions in the Navy for several years.  This study does not attempt to evaluate all of the 
innovative approaches to streamlining business processes and achieving financial 
efficiencies.  For example, the study excludes potential cost avoidance from base 
realignment and closure (BRAC) and privatization.  Instead, the study captures aggregate 
re-capitalization financing options in terms of major Navy spending categories and 
illustrates the impact of potential trade-offs using the specific example of a Marine Corps 
manpower rescission.  The study does not include detailed case studies of particular 
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outsourcing decisions.  Rather, we project the aggregate cost avoidance reasonably 
achievable from outsourcing and then frame the savings in terms of strategic risks using 
cost-benefit considerations from the private sector.  In summary, the study provides a top 
line analysis to underscore the scope and importance of pending budget decisions.   
E. OUTLINE 
We begin our study in Chapter II with a more detailed introduction to the fleet re-
capitalization challenge in the context of the global war on terrorism.  We detail the 
budgetary dimensions of the problem and identify key stakeholders in this issue.  Next in 
Chapter III we present the background and context of the issue.  We outline the various 
phases of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system, 
introduce key strategic planning documents, present the re-capitalization goals, justify the 
assumption of fixed top-line TOA, and introduce several budgetary tools available to 
Navy leadership.   
Chapter IV presents our analysis of re-capitalization financing alternatives.  We 
quantify the Navy re-capitalization goals and forecast major appropriations over the 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).  We illustrate the impacts of procurement 
financing through a vertical cut to military personnel.  We then contrast the impacts of 
financing through a horizontal cut to military personnel, operations and maintenance, and 
research and development.  We conclude Chapter IV with an overview of Navy budget 
trade-offs and motivate later discussion of outsourcing initiatives.   
Whereas Chapter IV provides and overarching view of the re-capitalization issue, 
Chapter V presents a more focused analysis of the implementation challenges arising 
from the proposed Navy budget trade-offs.  In Chapter V we explore options to apply a 
small Marine Corps manpower rescission of 0.2%.  The analysis summarizes the Marine 
Corps implementation of PPBE, summarizes the targeted appropriations, and presents 
three specific alternatives to achieve the required savings.  We conclude Chapter V by 
illustrating the scope and breadth of even a small budget cut as an illustration of both the 
magnitude and criticality of the trade-offs presented in Chapter IV.   
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Outsourcing has been viewed as a partial solution to the re-capitalization 
financing dilemma.  Given the necessity for cost reductions noted in Chapter IV and the 
real-world challenges illustrated in Chapter V, we present in Chapter VI a summary of 
DoD outsourcing initiatives.  We present an overview of current DoD practice, a 
summary of outsourcing cost-benefit and risk considerations popularized in the business 
literature, and an analysis of DoD lessons learned from recent outsourcing experience.   
Finally in Chapter VII we conclude with a summary of re-capitalization financing 
alternatives and review the business risks associated with outsourcing implementation in 
DoD.   
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II. INTRODUCTION 
A. RECAPITALIZATION REQUIREMENT 
The fleet re-capitalization challenge exists for several reasons.  First, in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Navy experienced a sharp 
increase in operational tempo.  The global war on terrorism requires forward presence, 
surge deployment capability and rapid exploitation of technological advantages.  
Although the aging fleet performed admirably throughout Operation Enduring Freedom 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom, platforms, crews and maintenance budgets were thinly 
stretched.  Navy procurement priorities are to arrest average aircraft age at a reasonable 
threshold while enhancing and expanding surface and subsurface capabilities.  Second, 
the non-discretionary portion of the federal budget is expected to grow considerably in 
the next decade with the first retirements among the “Baby Boomer” generation.  This 
growth will squeeze discretionary spending of which defense is a considerable 
percentage.  The Department of Defense (DoD) has adopted the pragmatic view that new 
capital asset procurement and the associated research and development should be 
financed within existing budget limits.  Finally, the cost of recruiting, training and 
retaining a professional military and civilian workforce continues to represent a sizeable 
portion of the Navy budget.  Although new technology has reduced manning 
requirements for some platforms, the logistics support for operational units remains a 
considerable component of the life-cycle cost.  Thus, reducing military end strength will 
be an important element of the procurement financing plan.  However, the risks 
associated with eliminating or outsourcing support functions must be acceptably 
quantified before making the required cuts.   
B. BUDGETARY DIMENSIONS 
The budgetary dimension of fleet re-capitalization is clear.  The Navy must 
develop a methodology to measure the relative costs and benefits of disparate programs 
across several appropriations to determine the most efficient and effective way to finance 
additional procurement.  The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
process provides a structured approach to this problem that captures the input of various 
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stakeholders.  However, the results will only be as good as the performance measures 
selected to equate various capabilities.  Specifically, Navy leaders must develop 
relationships that balance each funding category with procurement.  For example, the 
projected re-capitalization goal can be equated in current dollars to a percentage of Navy 
end strength.  But the decision to cut this end strength must be supported by some 
measure of mission capability that captures the trade-off between manpower and 
procurement.  These are not easy decisions.  In most cases, such overarching performance 
measures are not readily defined.   
A second budgetary dimension of this problem is the challenge of quantifying 
cost avoidance achieved through outsourcing.  Several high-visibility contracting 
irregularities during Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate both the cost and performance 
risks associated with outsourcing.  These risks are externalities that must be captured in 
the economic analyses of potential outsourcing targets.  Further, some outsourcing 
decisions may merely represent a transfer of cost between accounts.  For example, some 
argue that maintenance cost avoidance achieved through housing privatization is incurred 
as higher outlays for housing allowance.  Outsourcing cost-benefit analyses must include 
all additional acquisition costs to fairly represent any savings available for additional 
procurement.   
C. STAKEHOLDERS 
The breadth of these issues illustrates that fleet re-capitalization is not just a Navy 
problem.  There are many other stakeholders at various levels.  Most importantly, the 
Navy has a central role in the new national military strategy that includes both homeland 
defense and deterrence of terrorism, along with the traditional roles of forward presence 
and war fighting.  These missions require dominance of the littoral region in support of 
Marines, Special Forces and other combat units ashore, as well as control of the littoral 
airspace.  New “sea basing” capability and improved air defense technology will allow 
sustained U.S. dominance of key sea lanes, but the tough decisions required to finance 
such future capability will be made by echelon II commanders who must cut existing 
Navy programs without sacrificing current mission readiness.   
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In this chapter we have framed the fleet re-capitalization challenge in the context 
of the global war on terrorism.  We have identified the critical budget constraint to Navy 
TOA and have illustrated the budgetary dimensions of the problem.  Finally, we have 
identified the various stakeholders in this issue.  In the next chapter we will present the 
Navy re-capitalization goals in view of both the current strategic guidance and 
bureaucratic complexity of the Defense budgeting system.  We will motivate the 
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III. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
The fleet re-capitalization challenge can only be appreciated in the context of the 
complex political and bureaucratic processes that influence Defense spending.  This 
section presents the scope of the issue within the framework of the federal budget process 
and provides a summary of several specific budgeting tools available to Navy leaders.   
A. THE PPBE PROCESS 
The purpose of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
process is to allocate resources within the Department of Defense.  The PPBE process 
was established in 2003 and evolved from the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) first introduced into DoD in the early 1960's.  The PPBS was a cyclic 
process consisting of three distinct but interrelated phases: planning, programming, and 
budgeting.  These phases were basically sequential until 2001 when DoD began 
performing the programming and budgeting phases concurrently.  (U.S. Army, 2003, p. 
1) 
PPBS provided the framework and tools for future decision-making as well as an 
opportunity to reexamine prior decisions in light of the present evolving threats and 
changing economic conditions.  The PPBE process retained these same features but 
added more emphasis on the Department’s execution of the budget authority provided by 
Congress.  This was instituted to better evaluate whether funded programs are providing 
the expected benefits and to allow better resource allocation.   These goals support the 
ultimate objective of the PPBE process, which is to provide Combatant Commanders 
with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within established fiscal 
constraints.  (U.S. Army, 2003, p. 7) 
DoD uses the PPBE process to determine priorities and allocate resources.  In 
planning, determinations are made of the capabilities required to counter and defeat 
threats to national security, and the forces needed to provide those capabilities.  In 
programming, these force needs are prioritized and resources allocated to best meet the 
needs within fiscal, manpower, and force structure constraints.  In budgeting, the 
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components and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) scrub their programs to 
ensure efficient use of scarce budget authority. Finally, in the execution review, program 
output is assessed against planned performance to determine the best return on 
investment. The program, budget, and execution reviews occur concurrently.  (U.S. 
Army, 2003, p.16) 
The final activity in PPBE is the execution review, which occurs concurrently 
with the program and budget reviews.  While the purpose of the program review is to 
prioritize the programs which best meet military strategy needs and the purpose of the 
budget review is to decide how much to spend on each of these programs, the purpose of 
the execution review is to assess what is received for the money spent, i.e., actual output 
versus planned performance.  Performance metrics will measure program achievements 
and attainment of performance goals.  Over time, these metrics will be analyzed to 
ascertain whether resources are appropriately allocated.  (U.S. Army, 2003, p. 16) 
B. PLANNING 
Although the current defense transformation began in the late 20th century, the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 forced a fundamental re-thinking of U.S. defense 
strategy.  Asymmetric threats from unconventional adversaries prompted a revision of 
several key planning documents including the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  Further, the pace and urgency of transformation 
intensified at all levels as the need for new capabilities and greater agility was realized.   
The National Security Strategy is the President’s vision for U.S. international 
strategy and policy.  Published in September 2002, this document provided the 
framework for current defense planning efforts.  Notable in this revision was the call for 
“innovation in the use of military forces” and the declaration that the United States “will, 
if necessary, act preemptively” to prevent hostile action by its adversaries.  (US White 
House 15)  The structure and capabilities of a blue-water Navy built to fight the Cold 
War were considered by many Navy leaders to be inconsistent with the agility, flexibility 
and power projection implied by this call to action.   
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The Department of Defense had anticipated the new strategic requirements of the 
NSS in the QDR Report published a year earlier.  Prior to this revision, the QDR had 
called for a threat-based force capable of fighting two major theater wars, presumed to be 
Southwest and Northeast Asia, and delivering a decisive victory in one of the conflicts.  
The new vision was for a capabilities-based force engaged in a broader range of defense 
activities.  Specifically, the plan called for defense of the homeland, deterrence of 
aggression in four key regions, simultaneous prosecution of two major combat 
operations, and capability to conduct at least one smaller-scale contingency operation.  
The report noted that this “1/4/2/1” defense strategy would require “immediately 
employable forces, long range precision strike capabilities … and rapidly deployable 
maneuver capabilities.”  (US Department of Defense QDR 21, 2001) 
Explicit discussion of the fundamental shift in forces, equipment and training 
implied by the NSS and QDR was framed as the Defense Transformation Planning 
Guidance (TPG) published in April 2003.  A supplement to the Defense Planning 
Guidance, the TPG addressed the need for Services to meet the demands of the QDR by 
making the “difficult decision” of weighing near-term operational needs against 
investment in future capabilities.  The TPG noted that limited resources would require 
challenging trade-offs, but that transformation could not be delayed in favor of currently 
planned programs and systems.  (US Department of Defense TPG 4, 2003) 
Navy planning responded to these changes with the publication of a new Sea 
Power 21 vision in September 2002.  Intended to guide how the Navy would “organize, 
integrate, and transform”, Sea Power 21 included several subordinate programs designed 
to focus planning and programming effort on maintaining current readiness, investing in 
future readiness and streamlining business processes.  This final element, embodied as 
Sea Enterprise, was characterized as a zero-based review of all Navy business processes 
to identify core capabilities, eliminate waste and maximize resource utilization.  Shaped 
by successive annual CNO guidance reports, Sea Enterprise seeks to “improve 
productivity and find the resources to create the Navy of the future” by challenging all 




In response to these planning changes, Navy leadership developed a new 30-year 
global concept of operations.  Although the top priority remains prosecution of the global 
war on terror, the plan emphasizes the need for re-capitalization and transformation with 
specific focus on increasing and modernizing both fleet and naval air assets.  The new 
force structure plan calls for increasing the fleet battle force from its current level of 292 
ships in 2004 to 375 ships by fiscal year (FY) 22.  (Cariello)  In addition to surface 
combatants, this force will include submarines, sealift, expeditionary ships, mine 
clearing, and other support vessels.  The plan also establishes the goal of reducing overall 
average aircraft age to 12 years.  Currently, the average ages of tactical air, helicopter and 
support airframes are 14, 21 and 23 years, respectively.  At current procurement levels of 
100 aircraft per year in FY05 and FY06, these averages will continue to grow.  Increasing 
aircraft procurement by 80% to 180 aircraft per year over the future years defense plan 
(FYDP) would arrest average aircraft age at only 18 years.  (Cariello, 2004) 
The challenge for programmers is that these aggressive re-capitalization goals 
require dramatic increases in procurement spending over the FYDP.  Achieving the fleet 
re-capitalization goal of 375 ships by FY22 will require an average build rate of 
approximately 11.5 ships per year.  This represents spending roughly $14B per year for 
new construction and $2B per year for overhaul and conversion over the FYDP.  
Likewise, achieving even the target of 18 years average aircraft age will require a 
fourfold increase in aircraft procurement spending to over $20B per year by FY09.  
(Cariello)  Whereas all procurement has recently accounted for roughly 20-25% of Navy 
total obligation authority (US Department of Navy), these two procurement initiatives 
alone will account for over a third of the entire Navy TOA by FY07.   
Navy programmers are working on the assumption that due to limitations of 
discretionary federal spending, Navy TOA will not increase over the FYDP.  Thus, the 
Sea Enterprise Board of Directors is aggressively searching for cost avoidance initiatives 
that will provide sources of financing for increased ship and aircraft procurement.  The 
board is creating ideas that will improve productivity and reduce overall overhead cost.  
The FY04 FYDP already reflects $38B in savings validated by the Sea Enterprise team.  
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An additional $12B in new savings initiatives is under review.  (Clark CNO Guidance 4)  
Unfortunately, even this impressive early success of Sea Enterprise falls well short of the 
cost avoidance required to finance Navy re-capitalization goals.  Therefore, the CNO is 
personally carrying the message forward to the field level by visiting all Echelon II 
commands throughout 2004 to identify enterprise-wide efficiencies.  He is carefully 
scrutinizing all processes and products and questioning all cost assumptions.  The reality, 
however, is that further cost avoidance will require even more difficult program trade-
offs than those already considered.   
D. APPROPRIATION AND BUDGET EXECUTION 
Congress establishes Navy budget authority through the Defense Appropriation 
Act following a lengthy examination of the defense establishment and the President’s 
budget request.  Congress utilizes the Appropriations Act to control the level of 
expenditures in DoD.  Deliberations begin in February upon receipt of the President’s 
Budget, which includes the President’s plan for total obligation authority and 
expenditures in DoD.  In addition to the spending levels in the Appropriation Act, 
Congress must also approve the purposes for which funds are requested through a 
process called authorization.  Armed Services Committees and Appropriation 
Committees in both the House and the Senate principally conduct authorization and 
appropriation reviews.  Appropriations must be enacted as laws by signature of the 
President, but do not represent cash actually set aside in the U.S. Treasury.  Rather, the 
Act merely places limitations on amounts that agencies may obligate during a specific 
timeframe.  (U.S. Army, 2003, p.16) 
DoN has a total of five major appropriation accounts that fund both Navy and 
Marine Corps activities.  These appropriations include Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M), Military Personnel (MilPers), Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 
(RDT&E), Procurement, and Military Construction (MILCON).  As evident from 
Appendix B, the majority of the funds go to O&M, Military Personnel, and Procurement.  
(McCaffery and Jones, p. 273) 
DoD budget execution begins with the approval of Congress to spend 
appropriations through an allotment process.  During the allotment review, DoD must 
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show how it plans to spend approved appropriations, by quarter, month, or fiscal year 
depending on the type of appropriation.  After allotment approval is received from OMB 
and the Treasury, DoD begins the process of separating the DoD budget and distributing 
portions to the military departments, Services, and other DoD agencies.  After they have 
received their allotment authority, these resource claimants begin to incur obligations and 
then liquidate their obligations through the outlay of funds.  At the midpoint of the 
spending year, the military departments and services typically conduct a midyear review 
to facilitate shifting of money to areas of highest need.  By the end of the fiscal year, all 
DoD accounts must be reconciled with appropriations before they are closed.  
(McCaffery and Jones, p. 102) 
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E. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
The need for difficult trade-offs in defense planning is driven in large part by a 
constraint imposed on defense and other discretionary spending by rapidly increasing 
entitlement spending in the federal budget.  Coinciding with the need for Navy re-
capitalization is the pending retirement of many in the Baby Boomer generation who will 
become eligible to collect Social Security benefits.  The assumption of fixed TOA in 
Navy programming is derived in part from the belief that Congress will be unable to 
appropriate more for defense and still meet commitments to Social Security beneficiaries 
without causing unacceptably large budget deficits.   
Although many had thought that concern over Federal entitlement spending was 
premature, recent comments by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan brought the 
issue into the political mainstream.  Citing a “dramatic demographic change,” he 
explained that unless benefits are reduced or delayed, Federal entitlement programs will 
create “demands we almost surely will be unable to meet.”  (Chen)  Many budget 
analysts had already concluded that around 2025 outlays for entitlements would exceed 
income credited to the trust funds.  But the Congressional Budget Office diagram in 
Appendix A illustrates that outlays for Social Security and Medicare will actually exceed 
revenues as early as 2011.  The cause of this discrepancy is that surpluses in the trust 
funds have been used as a source of credit for government borrowing and must be repaid 
to avoid cash deficits.  (Clifton, 2004) 
Given the likelihood of fixed top line Navy budget authority, another constraint 
on Navy procurement is the competing need to fund Navy readiness accounts.  The 
increased operational tempo required by the global war on terror caused an increase in 
FY04 Operations and Maintenance (O&M) spending of more than 30% over the FY00 
baseline.  (US Department of Navy)  Vice Admiral Michael Mullen, DCNO for 
Resources, Requirements and Assessments, explained in January 2003 that the O&M 
budget decisions were appropriate to “bring our readiness accounts in line,” but strongly 
cautioned that if the Navy fails “to find efficiencies and harvest savings in all of our 
programs, we run a very real risk of failing to reach the long-term [modernization] goal.”  
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(Keeter)  Clearly, senior Navy leadership understands the funding challenge that lies 
ahead and the nature of the budget constraints.   
F. RESCISSIONS 
In recent years, Congress has addressed the shortfall in O&M budget authority 
using supplemental appropriations.  These appropriations occur separately from the 
annual Appropriation Act generated by review of the President’s budget and correct for 
unforeseen or emergency requirements that were omitted from the annual appropriation.  
The most notable was a $67 billion supplemental appropriations bill recently passed by 
Congress and signed by the President to help pay for the Global War on Terrorism and, 
more specifically, for current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Although the Navy has 
become somewhat dependant on supplemental appropriations to sustain current 
operations, the bills often contain language requiring rescissions in other accounts to help 
pay for the new budget authority.   
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 created the 
rescission process.  The main purpose of this act was to place a check and balance 
between the power of Congress and the President’s ability to impound appropriated 
funds.   Rescissions have allowed for changes in appropriations based on changing 
national priorities.  The rescissions are enacted to offset new spending programs or to 
shift spending to higher priority items.   
Under the provisions of the 1974 act, the President can propose to rescind 
spending authority provided by the Congress.  The Congress has 45 days (continuous 
session) to approve the President’s request, but it does not have to act on his proposals.  
During the 45-day period, the President can withhold the funds proposed for rescission.  
If Congress fails to act within the 45-day period, the funds must be made available for 
obligation.  (U.S. Congress, 1999) 
The Congress can also initiate rescissions.  Between 1990 and 1999, rescissions 
initiated by the Congress accounted for more than 60 percent of all rescinded budget 
authority and resulting first-year outlays.  Rescission proposals generally fall into two 
categories.  Most enacted rescissions are included in supplemental appropriation acts and 
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are explicitly intended to offset the spending contained in those acts.  The other general 
type of rescission is enacted in regular appropriation acts for a variety of purposes.  
Proposals have been introduced to Congress that would revise the rescission process to 
provide the President greater control over spending cuts; however, these proposals are not 
addressed in this study.  Later, we explore a Marine Corps manpower rescission to 
illustrate the difficult decisions required to implement even a relatively small budget cut.   
G. REPROGRAMMING AND TRANSFERS 
Navy budgeters also have some flexibility in the execution of appropriated funds.  
Reprogramming is the transfer of funds between programs of an appropriation that shifts 
funds from the original purpose for which Congress justified them.  This activity is 
allowed only if the amount of the reprogramming is below threshold reprogramming 
(BTR).  For example, current thresholds for military personnel accounts allow an increase 
of up to $10 million and no limit on decreases.  The BTR cannot exceed any established 
thresholds by Congress and may not decrease appropriations fenced for Congressional 
special interest items.  In addition, no BTR may exceed the greater of the above 
thresholds or 20 percent, whichever is less, of the appropriated level for each 
procurement line item or RDT&E program element.  (Zakheim, 2003) 
In this chapter we have presented the Navy re-capitalization goals in the context 
of the governing strategic guidance and the complex bureaucracy of the Defense 
budgeting system.  We have motivated and justified the assumption of fixed top-line 
Navy TOA.  Next we will forecast the budgetary impact of this program over the FYDP 
and present potential trade-offs among the major appropriations that would produce 
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IV. RE-CAPITALIZATION FINANCING 
In this section we return to the re-capitalization goals outlined above and consider 
them within the constraint of constant Navy TOA over the FYDP.  Data for this section, 
including top line budget figures for major spending categories, is drawn from the 
Department of Navy budgets for fiscal years 2000-2004 and presented in Appendices B-
F.  Also included are current procurement projections through FY09 for shipbuilding and 
conversion as well as aircraft construction and remanufacturing.    Note that the unit for 
all budget figures is millions of current-year dollars.   
To identify potential budget trade-offs to finance the level of procurement 
required to achieve Navy re-capitalization goals, we first identify applicable spending 
categories in the Navy budget that can be targeted for reduction.  Next, we state the scope 
and estimate the cost of annual re-capitalization procurement targets through FY09.  
Using historical cost averages and spending ratios from FY00-FY04, we then forecast 
budget estimates through FY09 for two different financing assumptions that achieve 
Navy re-capitalization goals.  The first is a vertical cut in the military personnel 
appropriation to finance additional procurement.  The second is a horizontal cut across 
MILPERS, O&M, and RDT&E.  We then consider the cost-benefit of these financing 
alternatives and briefly note the impact of outsourcing.  For analytical simplicity, we use 
top line budget figures for the major spending categories in the Navy budget.   
A. SPENDING CATEGORIES, APPENDIX B 
The FY04 total obligation authority is shown in Appendix B.  Seven major 
spending categories are listed.  Since the combined contribution of the MILCON, Family 
Housing, and Other line items is only 3.3% of Navy TOA, we exclude these from further 
analysis and consider only MILPERS, O&M, and RDT&E as potential spending 
categories to trade-off with procurement.   
B. RE-CAPITALIZATION GOALS AND COST, APPENDICES C-E 
The scope and cost of Navy re-capitalization goals are presented in Appendices C 
and D.  Appendix C lists quantities for new ship construction and conversion for the 
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period FY03 through FY09.  Actual cost data is provided for FY03-FY04.  From this 
information we develop an average cost estimate of $1.3B for each new ship constructed 
and $350M for each conversion.  These estimates are then used to project SCN cost 
forward through FY09.  The cost forecasts do not include inflation.  However, inflation 
would be offset by reduction of the average unit cost due to economic order quantity or 
other efficiencies in the procurement process.   
Similarly, Appendix D lists quantities for aircraft procurement and 
remanufacturing for the period FY03 through FY09.  Again, actual cost data is provided 
for FY03-FY04.  From this information we develop an average cost estimate of $90M for 
each aircraft constructed or remanufactured.  This estimate is used to project aircraft 
procurement cost forward through FY09.  As before, the cost forecasts include neither 
inflation nor future cost reduction from procurement efficiencies.   
The chart in Appendix E summarizes the procurement spending forecasts and 
illustrates the dramatic increase in cost associated with currently programmed targets.  
From the FY04 level of just over $20B, ship and aircraft procurement cost will grow to 
nearly $50B by FY09.  This $30B increase must be financed by cuts in other spending 
categories.   
C. BUDGET FORECASTS, APPENDICES F-J 
Having projected the cost of Navy re-capitalization, we next develop Navy budget 
forecasts in terms of the four major spending categories.  These forecast identify possible 
trade-offs to finance additional procurement.  Two methodologies are used.  The first is a 
vertical cut in MILPERS to offset additional procurement.  This approach recognizes that 
fleet modernization requires stable RDT&E spending to sustain a technological 
advantage.  It also recognizes that the global war on terror will require stable O&M 
spending to exercise the fleet, project power and engage in low intensity regional 
contingencies.  The second methodology is horizontal cut of RDT&E, O&M and 
MILPERS.  This approach recognizes that a deep cut in manpower is detrimental to both 
current and future readiness.  A significant reduction in manpower coupled with 
moderate cuts in O&M and RDT&E is a more traditional and conservative approach.   
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Appendix F provides Navy budget data for FY00-FY04.  Also shown are Navy 
end strength and fleet size in these same years.  Annual unit costs for both the operations 
and maintenance and manpower accounts are developed using ratio analysis.  Using end 
strength as the base for manpower, the resulting metric is cost per service member.  
Using fleet size as a proxy for the O&M base, the resulting metric is O&M cost per ship.  
These annual cost ratios are used to develop overall unit cost estimates of $54,000 in 
MILPERS cost per service member and $100M in O&M cost per ship.  These estimates 
will be helpful in evaluating the cost-benefit of various procurement financing 
alternatives.  The exhibit also shows the relative contributions of RDT&E, O&M and 
MILPERS to total annual non-procurement spending.  These percentages represent the 
historical mix of spending in these three categories.  The percentages selected for 
forecasting are 16% for RDT&E, 44% for O&M, and 41% for MILPERS.  These figures 
will be used later to apply a horizontal budget cut to these categories while holding TOA 
constant.  Maintaining these ratios ensures “fair-share” reduction of non-procurement 
accounts.   
D. VERTICAL BUDGET CUT TO MILPERS 
A budget forecast based on cutting MILPERS to fund additional procurement is 
shown as Appendix G.  The uncertainty of forecasting requires several simplifying 
assumptions consistent with the budgeting methodology.  In this case, two general 
assumptions are that inflation can be ignored and that total TOA for the four spending 
categories of interest will remain constant at the 2004 level of $116.7B.  Additional 
assumptions are specific to various spending categories.   
Since the sum of forecast ship and aircraft re-capitalization does not comprise all 
Navy procurement, an assumption must be made regarding the future level of other 
procurement programs such as those for communication, weapons and surveillance 
systems.  In 2004, ship and aircraft procurement represented 68% of overall Navy 
procurement.  As re-capitalization spending grows through FY09, this percentage is 
assumed to increase to 75% in FY05-FY07 and 80% in FY08-FY09.  These percentages 
recognize the relative increase in ship and aircraft procurement with respect to other 
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programs, but acknowledge the continued need for other procurement to support, sustain 
and integrate the new weapons platforms.   
Similarly, RDT&E spending must increase in support of new procurement.  The 
FY00-FY04 budget data reveal that current year RDT&E spending averages 38% of the 
procurement cost to be incurred two years in the future.  For example, FY02 RDT&E is 
38% of FY04 procurement.  Using this relationship, RDT&E spending is forecast as a 
function of future procurement through FY06, and capped at $20B in FY07-FY09 in 
recognition that efficiency is gained as new platforms move into low-rate initial 
production.   
Finally, O&M spending is held constant at the FY02 level of $32.4B for this 
forecast.  O&M spiked in FY03 due to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.  
FY04 O&M reflects reconstitution of combat units and rotation of occupation and 
support forces.  FY02 represents a reasonable estimate of the steady-state O&M 
requirement to sustain the war on terror and allows for realization of efficiencies over 
FY04 spending levels.   
Given these assumptions, MILPERS suffers a sharp decline in this budget 
forecast.  The impact of the required MILPERS budget cut can be measured in end 
strength using the manpower unit cost found above.  Note that end strength declines at an 
increasing rate over this period since programmed procurement targets are back-loaded 
with a sudden peak in FY09.  Forecast relationships among the four spending categories 
are shown graphically in Appendix H.   
E. HORIZONTAL BUDGET CUT TO MILPERS, O&M, RDT&E 
An alternate budget solution is presented as Appendix I.  Rather than target a 
single spending category for cost reduction, this forecast applies a horizontal cut across 
RDT&E, O&M and MILPERS to finance additional procurement.  The general 
assumptions for this forecast are the same as for the vertical cut forecast above.  
Specifically, inflation is ignored and TOA for the four spending categories of interest is 
assumed to remain fixed at $116.7B.  The procurement spending figures are also forecast 
in the same way as above.   
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Assumptions for the remaining spending categories in this forecast differ 
significantly from the previous example.  Rather than allow for growth in some non-
procurement spending categories, this approach applies a “fair-share” reduction across all 
categories.  This reduction is implemented by maintaining the relative spending ratios 
among the three non-procurement spending categories as their sum is reduced to achieve 
the allowed TOA.  Specifically, RDT&E, O&M, and MILPERS were found, on average, 
to contribute 14%, 41% and 44%, respectively, of non-procurement spending from FY00-
FY04.  This specific mix of spending is maintained throughout the forecast as 
procurement spending increases and all other categories decline.   
Given this new set of assumptions, the impact on MILPERS spending is 
significantly mitigated as shown graphically in Appendix J.  However, new risk is 
introduced by the reduction of both RDT&E and O&M.  RDT&E spending has direct 
influence on procurement programs.  Whereas RDT&E has historically been 38% of the 
procurement cost two years in the future, this forecast illustrates that RDT&E would fall 
to less than 20% of programmed procurement by FY07.  For example, the RDT&E 
forecast of $12B in FY07 is only 19.2% of the procurement forecast for FY09.  Similarly, 
O&M spending is required to exercise and utilize any new weapons platforms.  The 
historical O&M unit cost of $100M per ship allows estimation of the fleet that could be 
supported by forecast O&M spending.  The paradox of the horizontal cut to finance 
procurement is that reduction of O&M allows construction of a fleet that the Navy could 
not afford to operate.  For example, O&M spending forecast in FY09 supports a fleet of 
only about 240 ships when the inventory would exceed 310.   
F. INTERNAL TRADE-OFFS 
In the absence of significant budget relief from Congress, we have shown that 
achieving the current re-capitalization goals will require broad participation and 
significant sacrifice by Navy stakeholders.  As VADM Mullen suggests, one approach is 
to harvest savings identified by Sea Enterprise to fund new procurement.  The challenge 
with this approach is that unless entire functions are terminated or competing programs 
outright cancelled, current savings are only recognized as the present value of future cost 
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avoidance.  There is unlikely to be an immediate savings that can be programmed for 
procurement in the current Program Objectives Memorandum (POM).   
For example, VADM Mullen points to the decommissioning of F-14 squadrons, 
S-3 squadrons and the remaining Spruance-class destroyers as a source of procurement 
financing.  He notes that the manpower, training and support infrastructure associated 
with these platforms can be eliminated.  (Keeter)  However, decommissioning is a 
planned component of the life-cycle cost of a weapons system and implies the 
requirement for procurement of a replacement system.  It does not, therefore, represent a 
savings that can be used for additional new procurement.  Further, associated manpower 
and training infrastructure can only be eliminated if the new platforms require less of 
these resources.  If not, the new procurement must capture the life-cycle cost of personnel 
retraining and support infrastructure realignment.  Finally, any actual infrastructure 
reduction requires closure and remediation cost in the budget, which again competes with 
procurement.   
G. A NOTE ON OUTSOURCING, APPENDIX K 
The two budget forecasts above illustrate the severity of the re-capitalization 
financing problem in terms of impact to the other DoN spending categories.  Although 
later sections will explore competitive sourcing in detail, note here that a key assumption 
in both forecasts is that none of the programs and functions targeted for spending 
reductions would be outsourced.  Instead, they would be outright eliminated.  But many 
support functions targeted by Sea Enterprise are vital to current readiness and could not 
be outright eliminated.  Instead, they will be considered for outsourcing.  Examples of 
such non-core functions include base maintenance, galley services, barracks operations 
and non-tactical vehicle maintenance.   
Although some Navy leaders point to outsourcing as the solution to fleet re-
capitalization, allowance for outsourcing in the above examples would actually require a 
threefold increase in overall non-procurement budget cuts since data suggest that 
outsourcing reduces original program cost by only 30%.  (US Office of Management and 
Budget)  Since the above forecasts assume avoidance of all original program cost, 
outsourcing would re-introduce the remaining 70% of original program cost to the 
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analysis.  This cost would still need to be budgeted in a non-procurement account for 
contract payments if the function were outsourced rather than eliminated.   
Appendix K illustrates this limitation of outsourcing in dollar terms.  The total 
annual savings from all Navy and Marine Corps outsourcing initiatives is expected to 
reach $1.7B in FY05.  Although admirable, this represents only 1.5% of Navy TOA 
forecast for that year in the four largest spending categories.  Recall from the 
procurement cost growth chart in Appendix E that procurement spending is expected to 
increase by nearly $30B by FY09.  Although helpful, cost reductions from outsourcing 
alone are insufficient to finance re-capitalization.   
H. RE-CAPITALIZATION FINANCING CONCLUSIONS 
Defense planning documents call for a modern agile force with broadened 
operational capability to fight the war on terror.  Navy planners have translated this 
vision into a plan to re-capitalize the battle fleet and naval air forces over the next two 
decades.  Subsequently, Navy programmers have outlined the procurement milestones 
necessary to meet the goals established by the plan.  Anticipating no significant increase 
in Navy TOA, the Sea Enterprise team is searching for internal efficiencies that may help 
finance additional procurement.  However, the budget forecasts in this section suggest 
that the re-capitalization milestones are unrealistic unless the Navy is prepared to suffer 
unprecedented cuts in competing programs.   
If Navy TOA indeed remains capped near its current level, the internal trade-offs 
required to finance the desired fleet would cripple the Navy’s ability to operate.  For 
example, if Navy leaders cut MILPERS to finance procurement, then overall end strength 
must be reduced to 40% of the current level by 2008 and just 5% of the current level by 
2009.  If they choose a broader cut across not only MILPERS but also O&M and 
RDT&E, then overall end strength must still be reduced to roughly 65% of the current 
level by 2009 to sustain O&M spending at a rate that would support a fleet on only about 
240 ships.  Further, RDT&E spending in this scenario would probably be insufficient to 
sustain modernization at the required rate to achieve the re-capitalization goal by FY22.   
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The section also suggests that outsourcing alone is not a viable solution to the re-
capitalization financing problem.  Although the savings achieved through outsourcing are 
impressive, they currently amount to only about 1.5% of Navy TOA.  Such marginal 
savings will not significantly mitigate the re-capitalization budget dilemma.  In fact, this 
study frames the budget problem with the assumption that non-procurement functions 
and programs will be eliminated rather than outsourced.  If a capability is outsourced 
rather than eliminated, then fully 70% of the original program cost is retained.   
In this chapter we have estimated and forecast the cost of programmed fleet re-
capitalization and have quantified potential budget trade-offs that could finance the effort.  
We have concluded that planned procurement will require crippling cuts in competing 
appropriations and that outsourcing will offer only limited financial relief.  In the next 
chapter we consider an alternative solution.  The Sea Enterprise team is studying 
opportunities to streamline current operations and capture savings for re-capitalization.   
We explore this approach by introducing the scenario of a small rescission to Marine 
Corps manpower and then trace the practical ramifications of the cut.  Our analysis will 
reveal that even very modest cuts to current appropriations have far-reaching 
ramifications that challenge our way of thinking about national defense.   
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V. MARINE CORPS MANPOWER RESCISSION 
The previous section projected to the gravity of the re-capitalization budget 
dilemma and suggested that goals will be achieved only by close scrutiny of every non-
procurement program for substantial savings.  To cast this monumental effort in a more 
manageable framework, we now turn to a specific example in which the Marine Corps 
faces a requirement to execute a relatively small rescission in manpower funding.  The 
following analysis highlights the Marine Corps implementation of PPBE and the breadth 
of options that could be considered to execute the mandated cut.  This section provides a 
rich example of the business analysis that must occur in every arena if the Navy is to 
approach re-capitalization targets.  This section draws data from DoN budget estimates 
for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 as well as two studies conducted by RAND for the U.S. 
Army.   
A. BASIS FOR RESCISSION 
The scenario we are presenting is a result of Congressional action to reduce DoD 
appropriations by $1.8 billion using “across the board” reductions.  In the scenario, a $67 
billion supplemental appropriations bill was recently passed by congress and signed by 
the President to help pay for the continuing Global War on Terrorism as well as current 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Within the supplemental appropriations bill, 
Congress has directed several government agencies, including DoD, to report back with 
recommended figures for rescission by appropriation.  DoD split the $1.8 billion using a 
"fair-share" percentage of the total budget for each service.  The services continued with 
the equal distribution of cuts among their appropriations, and the Military Personnel 
Marine Corps (MPMC) "fair-share" is $25 million.   
To frame the issue of cutting $25 million from the MPMC budget, this section 
will explore the Marine Corps implementation of the PPBE process, the flow of funds to 
MPMC, and options the Marine Corps can take.  Timing of the rescission is at a critical 
stage in the execution of current fiscal year appropriations.  The rescission requirement 
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was announced toward the end of March leaving very little time to make effective 
changes without causing major disruptions that could impact Marine Corps operations.   
B. MARINE CORPS PLANNING 
Marine Corps planning is strongly influenced by two naval strategy documents: 
“Sea Power 21” and "Marine Corps Strategy 21."  Several operational concepts have 
evolved from this strategic foundation including Operational Maneuver From the Sea 
(OMFTS), Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) and Sea Basing.  Guided by these 
concepts, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) develops the Commandant’s 
Planning Guidance (CPG) that provides overall strategic direction for the Marine Corps.  
The CPG is the basis for developing the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) that 
provides long-range concepts, capabilities, and goals considered essential to accomplish 
the Marine Corps mission 20-30 years into the future.  It also provides mid-range 
direction (2-10 years out) for developing programs and budgets.   
The MCMP articulates the Marine Corps operational requirements in the areas of 
doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and facilities and support.  
This plan directly links operational planning to programming for new equipment and 
weapon systems initiatives.  The MCMP guides the programming and budgeting of the 
PPBE in order to achieve the forces and capabilities required by the Fleet Marine Forces.  
(Sullivan, 2002,  p.126) 
The Marine Corps uses the Combat Development Process (CDP) to determine 
battlefield requirements and provide the resources necessary to produce combat ready 
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).  A key component of the CDP is the 
Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS).  The CBRS develops operational, 
functional, and tactical concepts that lead to the development of combat capabilities.  It 
employs a planned approach that compares current doctrine, tactics, techniques, 
procedures, equipment, and support to national policy and strategy, and projections of 
future threats and technological advances.  In addition to the CPG and the MCMP, 
guidance for combat development comes from various DoD documents such as the 
National Military Strategy, Joint Vision, and Defense Planning Guidance.  During each 
planning, programming, budgeting and execution cycle, this planning effort is distilled 
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into specific programming guidance that is used to develop the current program 
objectives memorandum (POM).  The general process and relationships among the 
Marine Corps planning activities is shown in Figure 2 below.  (Sullivan, 2002,  p. 126) 
 
 
Figure 2.   Marine Corps Planning Activities  
 
C. MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMING 
The unique status of the Marine Corps as one of two services within one military 
department is significant in shaping the Marine Corps resource allocation process.  Since 
the Marine Corps POM is incorporated directly into the DoN POM, the Marine Corps 
resource allocation process is closely tied to that of the Navy.  The Navy is given a Total 
Obligation Authority (TOA) or “top line” in the Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef) fiscal 
guidance that is then allocated between the Navy and the Marine Corps.  The Marine 
Corps receives approximately 14 percent of the Navy's TOA.  This percentage of the 
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Navy's TOA is called “green dollars” and is left up to the Marine Corps to allocate for its 
programs.  An additional 6 percent of Navy TOA supports Marine aviation and other 
amphibious programs.  The effect of these split responsibilities is that the Marine Corps 
programming decisions are constantly being made in two different, interactive processes.  
In the end, the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) submits one consolidated POM to the 
Secretary of Defense.  (Sullivan, 2002,  p. 128) 
Once the Marine Corps TOA is determined, the Deputy Commandant for 
Programs and Resources determines the core funding level.  This identifies programs that 
do not require re-evaluation during each POM cycle, such as manpower costs, stable 
investments, and other “cost-of-doing-business” programs.  The core programs are 
similar to entitlement/non-discretionary funding identified in the President's Budget.  All 
other programs are considered discretionary and are categorized as "above core."  Once 
the core is established and top-down guidance is provided, a series of programming 
forums assess new initiatives and refine recommendations.  At the front end of this 
progression, the Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs) begin assessing the benefit of 
above-core initiatives and issues.  There are six PEGs, five of which are organized by 
appropriation categories: Manpower (Personnel), Operations and Maintenance, 
Investment (Research & Development and Procurement), Family Housing, and Military 
Construction.  (Sullivan, 2002,  p. 127) 
The PEGs collect program initiatives from the operational forces, the Marine 
Corps Warfighting Lab, and other organizations, and then evaluate these initiatives 
against prioritized requirements lists generated by the Concept-Based Requirements 
System (CBRS).  The PEGs do not consider fiscal constraints.  They consider the full 
range of initiatives and prioritize them in terms of benefit to the overall mission 
independent of cost.  Each of the PEGs forwards a prioritized list of programs (specific to 
their appropriation category) to the POM Working Group (PWG).  The PWG 
consolidates, assesses, and prioritizes the recommendations from the PEGs. Unlike the 
PEGs, the PWG must consider the financial impact and produce a recommended program 
that is within the Marine Corps TOA.  The PWG forwards its recommendations to the 
Marine Corps Program Review Group (PRG).   
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The PRG reviews program issues identified by the PWG and resolves all but the 
major issues.  Once the PRG has ensured that the program is balanced, it forwards the 
recommended program to the Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) that is 
chaired by the Assistant Commandant.  Once approved, the MROC briefs the program to 
the Commandant, and with his approval, the Marine Corps POM is delivered to SecNav 
for approval and inclusion in the DoN POM.  (Sullivan, 2002,  p. 127) 
As Sullivan points out, the process described above functions to translate the 
broader choices made during the planning phase into detailed packages of capability 
objectives that are balanced and fiscally achievable.  The Marine Corps programming 
process is summarized in Figure 3 below.  (Sullivan, 2002,  p. 128) 
 
Figure 3.   Marine Corps Programming Process 
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D. MARINE CORPS BUDGETING 
The Navy Budget Office, officially titled Fiscal Management and Budget (FMB), 
is the central budget office of the DoN.  It is responsible for preparing both the Navy and 
Marine Corps budgets.  (McCaffery and Jones, p. 248)   Some of the duties performed by 
FMB include: (1) Establishment of the general principles, policies, and procedures that 
control the preparation, presentation, and administration of the DoN budget; (2) 
Establishment of the appropriation structure for preparation and justification of the 
budget; (3) Supervision of the analysis and review of DoN budget estimates, and 
submission and negotiation of the budget with the SecDef, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), and Congress; (4) Supervision of any reprogramming of funds by DoD 
or Congress; (5) Principle point of contact for outside agencies and other military 
department budget offices in all DoN budgetary matters.  (McCaffery and Jones, p. 249) 
FMB1 is responsible for reviewing, recommending, and revising estimates for the 
MilPers and O&M appropriations, and other funds of the Navy and Marine Corps.  For 
the Congressional review, the FMB1 analysts are responsible for preparing or clearing 
budget material provided to Congress in support of MilPers and O&M appropriations.  
This may include budget justifications, clarification statements, a transcript of hearings, 
answers to questions, point papers, and appeals to authorization and appropriation 
reports.  (McCaffery and Jones, p. 250-251) 
E. MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS 
The rescission in this section targets the Military Personnel appropriation.  
MilPers provides funds for pay, allowances, individual clothing, permanent change of 
station travel, and expenses of temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations for 
those members on active duty.  Funds are also provided for retirement pay of military 
personnel, including reserve components.  These are one-year operating appropriations, 
and are available for obligation only during the year for which they are appropriated.  
They are managed at department headquarters level (Army, Navy, and Air Force).  
Estimates of the amounts needed are based on personnel end strengths.  The 
Appropriations Act stipulates the amount of new obligation authority available to cover 
military personnel costs.  In addition, the active duty military personnel strength, showing 
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the number of officers, enlisted men, midshipmen, and cadets, is present in the Act. The 
Act also serves as a control mechanism because Congress is able to stipulate the size of 
military force structures by adjusting appropriation authorization levels.  (U.S. Army, 
2003 p. 17) 
The DoN MilPers appropriation is divided into two categories, active and reserve.  
The active MilPers is composed of Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) and Military 
Personnel, Marine Corps, (MPMC) appropriations.  The reserve MilPers consists of 
Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN), and Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps (RPMC) 
appropriations.  Figure 4 depicts this relationship.  (Taylor, p. 42) 
 
Figure 4.   Marine Corps MilPers appropriations 
 
The budget activities funded by the MPN and MPMC include pay and allowances 
of officers, enlisted, and midshipman, subsistence of enlisted personnel, permanent 
change of station travel, and other military personnel costs.  The budget activities funded 
by the RPN and RPMC appropriations also include unit and individual training and other 
training and support.   
When determining the MilPers budget estimate, analysts use an average cost 
basis.  The numbers of people promoted, departing, arriving and already serving are all 
factors that affect the level of the MilPers budget estimate.  The allotment for pay and 
allowances, which requires the most from the MilPers account, is established from these 
estimates.  (Taylor, p. 43) 
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For fiscal year 2004, Congress authorized $8.97 billion for MPMC.  Our goal of 
saving $25 million represents 0.28 percent of the authorized appropriations for MPMC.   
The cost savings involved in this case could come from any combination of 
programs within MPMC appropriations.  Moving funds from other appropriations is a 
"transfer" and would require transfer authority.  In our case we will consider only cost 
savings and will not address reprogramming or transfers to meet the $25 million cost 
savings goal.   
F. COST SAVING OPTIONS 
The U.S. Marine Corps can review studies of other services and how they 
accomplished cost savings to meet new budget constraints (such as a rescission).  The 
following sections show possible options for cost savings.  Some are temporary, short-
term fixes, while others provide long-term savings.  In addition, although quantitative 
data was not available, a qualitative look at some areas may provide insight into further 
alternatives.  A combination of options is most plausible given future budget constraints. 
1. Restructuring Overseas Commands 
The RAND Institution conducted a study in 1996 – 1997 for the U.S. Army to 
examine the feasibility of rotating units from the United States to maintain a forward 
presence in Europe, vice permanently stationing units in Europe.  The objective of the 
study was to identify the most important policy changes and assess both the feasibility 
and potential costs.  More specifically, the U.S. Army was interested in re-stationing four 
heavy brigades and division support units back to the United States while maintaining the 
same amount of forward presence in Europe through six-month rotations.   
The Army study was driven in part by DoD downsizing that began affecting all of 
the military services in the late 1980s and continues today.  The following table shows 









1987 2,168 777 583 199 609
1988 2,I38 769 581 197 591
1989 2,121 766 584 196 575
1990 2,079 750 583 196 550
1991 2,033 734 575 198 526
1992 1,898 663 551 190 494
1993 1,743 590 520 181 452
1994 1,654 560 485 175 434
1995 1,562 528 449 174 411
1996 1,490 497 426 173 394
1997 1,439 492 396 174 377
1998 1,412 483     385 172 372
1999 1,377 473 370 172 362
2000 1,373 475 370 172 356
Source: Washington Headquarters Services, 2000  (qty in 1000s)  
 
Table 1.   Average Active Duty Military Strength 
 
Effects of these manpower reductions included the reorganization of units and/or 
reduction in unit strengths.  The U.S. Army was particularly hard hit with reductions of 
over 300,000 personnel.  Meanwhile, new missions appeared for the European Command 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the former Soviet Union.   
The end to the Cold War changed the United States' overall National Security 
Strategy from a bi-polar and global focus to a multi-polar regional focus with many 
asymmetric threats.  With Desert Shield/Storm, the DoD was able to temporarily stall the 
trend in manpower reductions, but was still engaged in force shaping to meet new 
missions requirements looming on the horizon.  These new missions were quite different 
from the long-standing Cold War mission to defend central Europe.  They instead placed 
more emphasis on regional conflicts, humanitarian activities, military to military 
exchanges, and peacekeeping operations.   
The European Command went from 213,000 soldiers in 1990 to 122,000 in 1992, 
and from 858 installations to only 415.  The reduction target was even more severe – to 
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decrease manpower to 65,000 by 1995.  The units that were transferred, re-designated, or 
inactivated included the VII Corps, the 3d Armored Division, the 8th Infantry Division 
(Mechanized), the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 11th Armored Cavalry 
Regiment.  Many smaller supporting units also disappeared.   
Today, V Corps is the U.S. Army's only forward-deployed corps, consisting of 
two heavy divisions, a corps support command and nine separate brigades totaling 
approximately 41,000 soldiers.  V Corps represents the bulk of U.S. Army Europe’s 
combat power and is continuously engaged in the European Command’s area of 
responsibility.  On any given day, twenty five percent of V Corps is deployed.  (Pike, 
2002) 
Given these significant manpower changes, RAND was commissioned by the 
Army to determine, in part, how the U.S. Army was going to meet emerging mission 
requirements in the European and Southwest Asia theaters.  Defense downsizing created, 
and continues to create, competition for declining resources.  Not only did the U.S. Army 
need to figure out how to maintain a forward presence, but they also needed to do it as 
cheaply as possible.   In addition to cost savings, the U.S. Army wanted to accomplish 
other specific objectives to include stabilizing the soldiers and their families, and 
increasing flexibility to meet mission requirements.  In so doing, a key goal was to keep 
from diminishing training and readiness.   
The chart below provides a summary of the RAND study findings.  The high 
points at the time of the study were that the Army could move 20,000 to 25,000 personnel 
and 15,000 family members back to the United States; however, this would increase 
family separation time.  Frequency of PCS moves would decrease overall.  Training and 
readiness would have to be managed, weighing the positive effects of smaller, more 
flexible units, with the negative of reduced training cycles to cover all mission areas.  But 
perhaps of most interest to the Marine Corps in this study are the cost findings shown in 
figure 5.  (Hix et. al, 2003) 
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Figure 5.   RAND study findings for U.S. Army Europe manning  
 
Cost savings were broken down into one-time initial expenditures and recurring 
benefits that reduce costs in later years.  One-time expenditures, estimated at $700 to 
$830 million (range due to site options) were primarily construction costs to move units 
into non-existing structure in the United States.  Recurring annual savings, estimated at 
$200 to $350 million (range due to variances in housing and separation allowances) 
included housing savings, cost of living allowance savings, and PCS savings.   
This study advised on the feasibility of moving military forces from overseas 
locations.  The lesson here is that between the publishing of the report and today, the U.S. 
Army personnel strength in the European Command has dropped from 65,000 to 41,000.  
This is a possible solution that could be adopted by the Marine Corps to meet cost 
savings in the short-term and could also be sustained for the long-term.   
The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force that relies on quickly deterring the 
enemy through forward presence.  Although the Marine Corps performs many missions 
in support of the National Security Strategy, this analysis centers on the permanent force 
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structure in Okinawa, which could be reduced while still meeting mission goals.  As 
shown in Figure 6 below (DoD, 2001), deployed Marines provide forward in the Pacific 
and Southwest Asia rather than Marines stationed overseas.  Restructuring units in 
Okinawa could be one answer to the manpower rescission.   
 
Figure 6.   Marine Corps Overseas Presence 
 
Currently there is a permanent structure in Okinawa, which for the most part 
supports the Unit Deployment Program (UDP).  These transient Marines come from 
personnel stationed throughout the United States.  Reducing the overseas force structure 
could be achieved in many forms, but the general idea would be to keep base and training 
area infrastructure, establish an equipment readiness pool (similar to 29 Palms), and keep 
only minimal skeleton staffs (similar to the already standing 4th Marine Regiment on 
Okinawa).  In addition, since III MEF and 3d Division are already "light" units compared 
to U.S.-based counterparts, combining them into a true Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
would also reduce unnecessary hierarchy within higher headquarters.   
Today the Marine Corps personnel strength in Okinawa is approximately 20,000.  
The Marine Corps has adopted a two-year unaccompanied tour length, although 
personnel with one-year tour lengths are finishing their prescribed tours.  In addition, 
approximately one-third of the personnel are on three-year accompanied tours.  To 
execute  this  plan,  the  Marine Corps could stop a large portion of permanent change of  
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station (PCS) moves to Okinawa, excluding billets required for the restructure.  An 
estimated 5,000 personnel (700 officers and 4,300 enlisted) will PCS to Okinawa during 
the summer of 2004.   
DoN FY2004/2005 Budget Estimates reveal that the PCS cost to move Marines to 
Okinawa is approximately $12,000 for officers and $6,000 for enlisted.  Canceling 5,000 
moves to Okinawa would reduce the MPMC budget by $32 million, exceeding the 
rescission target.  In fact, canceling just 400 officer moves and 3,400 enlisted moves 
would meet the $25M objective.   
Notwithstanding considerable manpower turbulence in Okinawa during the 
summer of 2004, this proposal represents an immediate “fix” to the rescission and is also 
sustainable.  Marines returning to the United States would not require new infrastructure 
as proposed by the U.S. Army, since these Marines would fill current structure shortages 
on U.S. Marine Corps bases.  Priority units are currently manned between only 70 to 80 
percent of tables of organization.  Finally, this proposal meets many current DoD 
performance goals including: (1) support U.S. regional security alliances through 
military-to-military contacts and routine presence of ready forces overseas, (2) maintain 
ready forces to provide U.S. with the ability to shape the international security 
environment, (3) transform U.S. military forces for the future, and (4) streamline the DoD 
infrastructure.   
2. Modifying PCS Standards 
Since much of the cost avoidance associated with restructuring overseas 
commands is from reduced PCS moves, modifying general PCS policies may have an 
even greater overall savings effect.  A study done by RAND in 1994 for the U.S. Army 
gives perspective to this proposal.   
The turbulence of PCS moves causes both monetary and non-monetary costs.  
Since the non-monetary costs and possible future gains from modified PCS standards are 
not readily quantified, this section focuses primarily on the measurable PCS expense.   
The Marine Corps alone spends close to $300 million per year on PCS moves.   
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The six basic classes of PCS moves used by the Marine Corps are depicted in 
Table 2 below.  Both the accession and separation travel figures are likely to remain 
roughly unchanged unless there is either a major change in end-strength or a policy 
change affecting duration of service.  Rotational travel, defined as movement of Marines 
to and from overseas, was discussed in the prior section; however, changes to tour length 
policies could have an additional effect in this area.  Operational travel includes PCS 
movements of personnel within the Continental U.S. and “overseas” movements that are 
not transoceanic.  Training travel is for PCS to formal schools while unit travel results 
from re-stationing entire units.   
 
Table 2.   Summary of Marine Corps PCS Travel Requirements 
 
The data in Table 2 are presented graphically in Figure 7 below.  Following are 
the percentages of total PCS travel represented by the various categories:  Rotation travel, 
36%; Operation, 25%; Accession, 15%; Separation, 15%; Training, 3%; Unit, 1%; TLE 
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(temporary lodging, which spans all classes), 4%; and IPCOT (in-place consecutive 
overseas tours), 1%.   

















Figure 7.   Marine Corps PCS travel expense by category 
 
After rotation travel, the next highest expenditure in the PCS budget is operation 
travel.  The two basic ways of saving costs in operational travel are extending tour 
lengths and/or allowing for more changes of assignment within the same geographic area 
(referred to as Permanent Change of Assignment (PCA) vice PCS).   
The Marine Corps, like the other services, has a standard tour length of three 
years; however, unlike the other services, major Marine Corps bases are only located in a 
handful of geographic areas.  This presents a possible rescission solution through either 
extending some PCS tour lengths or increasing PCA moves.  A change to the overall tour 
length policy is not required to achieve target savings.   
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Canceling or delaying PCS moves and/or redirecting personnel to new 
assignments in the same geographic location presents an immediate solution to meet the 
$25 million target in summer 2004.  An initial proposal that equates the ratio of affected 
officer to enlisted personnel to the overall Marine Corps personnel ratio results in 
stopping or redirecting 500 officer and 4,000 enlisted PCS moves.  This would save an 
estimated $25 million at a rate of $10,000 per officer move and $5,000 per enlisted move.  
Affected personnel would represent only 2.5 percent of the officer community and 2.6 
percent of enlisted Marines.  This is a temporary fix; however, this policy would also be 
sustainable in the future given more flexibility in tour lengths and PCA for certain 
communities.   
3. Officer Career Level Schools 
Each year the Marine Corps moves officers to attend schools to complete grade 
appropriate professional military education (PME).  PCS cost savings can also be realized 
by addressing this area.  All Marine Corps captains must complete Expeditionary 
Warfare School (EWS) and majors must complete Command and Staff College (CSC) in 
order to be competitive for promotion.  The Marine Corps offers two methods for officers 
to complete these courses.  An officer can either attend a resident school or complete the 
appropriate correspondence course.  For promotion purposes, both the resident school 
and correspondence course are considered equal.  The costs involved for the two methods 
are not even close to being equal.  Correspondence courses require only are printing, 
shipping and administrative handling costs.  Resident schools include student PCS costs, 
the loss of the student from his or her service to the operating forces, the loss of the 
faculty from the operating forces, the faculty PCS costs, utility and administrative support 
costs.  Both EWS and CSC convene from July through May and have a student body of 
approximately 200 officers each.  Canceling a session of EWS and CSC would yield a $4 
million cost savings for the PCS costs of the students.  Long term cost savings of shutting 
down both resident schools would yield a greater cost savings and increase the benefit to 
the operating forces.  Another option for long-term manpower savings would be to 
shorten the school length to less than 180 days, the threshold beyond which temporary 
duty becomes a PCS.   
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4. Other Areas for Consideration 
Cost savings could be achieved in other areas such as changes to accession, 
separation, promotion, and bonus policies.  The following is a brief discussion of possible 
short-term and long-term effects in these areas.   
The Marine Corps has budgeted for approximately 1,600 officer accessions and 
32,000 enlisted accessions for FY2004.  Of these accessions nearly half take place over 
the summer months.  Accession PCS dollars amount to approximately $5,000 for new 
officers and $1,400 for new enlisted Marines.  From basic pay tables, the first 4 months 
of pay and allowances is about $14,000 for officers and $10,000 for enlisted.  Temporary 
cost savings of $25 million could be achieved if the average summer accessions dropped 
by 100 officers and 2,300 enlisted over the summer.   
Although possible, this "fix" could only be sustained if end-strength numbers 
were reduced.  This temporary savings would have to be made up, if not in the following 
fiscal year with increased accessions, then at the end of current contracts at a higher pay 
rate (independent of net present value calculations).  Furthermore, the detrimental effects 
of not accessing new personal even for a short period of time would be felt for many 
years to come.  For example, training pipelines would slow down and create backlogs as 
more than expected personnel entered the system at a later date.  Promotion rates may 
increase for a time period but would have to eventually decrease.  Finally, the rotation 
schedule would be off balance.  Replacement personnel needed in summer months would 
not be available to relieve prior year’s forces scheduled to move from their current 
command.   
This section excludes an analysis of changing separation, bonus, or promotion 
policies since he Marine Corps is not currently in a draw down and current separation 
incentive programs (as for schools) are already accounted for in the budgeting process.  
Also, authorizing early separations simply for the purpose of saving money in the current 
fiscal year MPMC budget may signal Congress that a reduction in end-strength is merited 
for future years.  This is not a signal the Marine Corps wants to send.   
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A quick review of retention studies, quantitative and qualitative, identified the 
impracticality of pursuing budget cuts for bonuses and promotions.  Both of these areas 
are tied to retention rates.  To quantify the outcome of a cut in these areas would require 
extensive study and regression analysis.  But, cuts in this area even for the short-term are 
not recommended.   
G. SUMMARY OF MARINE CORPS MANPOWER RESCISSION  
In this section we introduced a scenario in which the Marine Corps manpower 
appropriation was reduced by $25 million midway through the fiscal year.  We briefly 
described the budgeting process, the source of appropriations, and provided cost savings 
proposals.  The cost savings options introduced were restructuring overseas commands, 
delaying PCS moves, canceling resident officer PME, and also other areas for 
consideration.  All of these options have short-term effects and long-term implications.  
Any changes to current programs, even changes as small as 0.2% of an appropriation, 
will create a ripple effect that will permeate throughout the Marine Corps.  The best 
solution would be one that minimizes the effect of the ripple.   
One area that continued to surface among all options was the services ability to 
affect PCS costs.  The reduction or delay in PCS moves appears to be the most feasible 
and causes the least amount of disruption.  The RAND graphic shown below as Figure 8 
is applicable to all military services.  (Hix et. al 1998)  It provides a good synopsis of 
what drives the cost in each PCS class as well as the amount of control a military service 




Figure 8.   PCS Cost Drivers and Policy Actions  
 
Taking into account externalities and opportunity costs, the entire cost savings 
goal should not come from a single proposal, but from a mix of several options.  By 
determining the maximum utility of all options, given a budget constraint, the Marine 
Corps can minimize the detrimental effects of the rescission.  Many externalities and 
opportunity costs are difficult to quantify and measure, but must be considered when 
determining marginal benefit and marginal cost of any resource.   
In this chapter we have traced the far-reaching ramifications of even a small 
reduction in Marine Corps manpower.  We have thus framed the enormity of the trade-
offs discussed in Chapter IV and have illustrated the challenges and limitations of 
financing fleet re-capitalization through merely streamlining operations.  Many cost-
avoidance proposals like those presented above will be deemed too difficult or disruptive 
for the efficiency gained.  Instead, many will look to outsourcing as the long-term 
solution to capturing business efficiencies.  Although we noted in Chapter IV that 
outsourcing offers only limited financial relief with respect to the overall re-capitalization 
 46
requirement, outsourcing has become a common and widespread practice in DoD.  In the 
next chapter, we review the DoD guidance on outsourcing, present the strategic issues 
associated with outsourcing in the private-sector business literature, summarize lessons 
learned from recent DoD outsourcing experience, and chart the road ahead for 
outsourcing initiatives.   
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VI. OUTSOURCING OPTIONS 
All the effort in this study, to this point, has been to illustrate the grave financial 
circumstances facing the Department of the Navy.  Resolving the problems related to 
increasing mission and resource demands within budget constraints appears to be an 
almost insurmountable task.  On one hand, the DON must be able to fight and win wars.  
On the other, the operating and readiness budgets must be reduced to finance re-
capitalization.  The key question in this case then becomes: how are we going to do both?  
This same question has been fielded many times and the usual suspects seem to give the 
same, unspecific “cure all” answer: outsourcing.  It seems as though everyone involved in 
this process has the predominance of their hopes riding on outsourcing to save the day.  
We have shown in Chapter IV that outsourcing will produce an admirable savings, but 
nowhere near the total savings needed.  It is, however, a good start.   
The following section on the inherent risks and resulting lessons learned from 
outsourcing is provided to assist those who are beginning their long cost-saving journey 
with this approach.  The hope here is that those who are considering outsourcing as a cost 
saving measure will consider the delineated risks thoroughly and heed previous lessons 
learned before making a final decision.   
A. THE GOVERNMENT OUTSOURCING ROADMAP 
The Office of Management and Budget has taken the first step toward outsourcing 
efficiency with the production of Circular Number A-76.  A-76 can be considered the 
Federal Government outsourcing roadmap, in that it shows the way from the beginning of 
the outsourcing process to the end.  It describes, often in unspecific terms, when and how 
to outsource.  Using vague terms such as “inherently governmental” and “significantly 
affecting,” A-76 tends to provide a limitless grey area in which to operate, potentially 
adding confusion to the process.  What A-76 does not do is give instruction as to what 
risks need to be considered in the decision making process.  Risks directly affect the 
bottom line and are often key determining factors in the success or failure of an 
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outsourcing initiative.  The simple fact is that risks are often replaced with bottom line 
savings estimates that effectively gold-plate risky outsourcing alternatives. 
B. THE OUTSOURCING PROCESS 
The outsourcing process, depicted in Figure 9 below, begins with the 
classification of activities currently performed by government personnel as either 
commercial or inherently governmental.  A commercial activity is defined as “a recurring 
service that could be performed by the private sector and is resourced, performed, and 
controlled by the agency through performance by government personnel, a contract, or a 
fee-for-service agreement.  A commercial activity is not so intimately related to the 
public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel”  (A-76 pg A-3)  An 
inherently governmental activity is one “that is so intimately related to the public interest 
as to mandate performance by government personnel.  These activities require the 
exercise of substantial discretion in applying governmental authority and/or making 
decisions for the government.”  (A-76 pg. A-2)  All government activities are required to 
complete this classification process yearly and prepare an activities inventory that 
identifies the classification results.   
Once the classification process is completed, the annual inventory of all activities 
is submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  OMB then reviews the 
inventory submissions, submits the inventories to Congress and the public, and publishes 
a notice of availability in the Federal Register.  At this point, all activities deemed 
commercial are eligible to begin the public announcement phase.  (A-76 pg. A-1)   
The public announcement phase begins with the announcement of an A-76 study 
by the government agency involved.  The public announcement is composed of necessary 
information for all parties involved and includes agency information, activity 
information, and important dates.  From the public announcement a Performance Work 
Statement (PWS) and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) are developed.  
These documents include necessary performance data, performance standards, and any 
other information necessary for the successful completion of the activity.  (OSD, Share 
A-76!)   
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The PWS and QASP are distributed to the private sector and originating agency.  
The private sector parties submit offers for completion of services to a Source Selection 
Authority (SSA) who evaluates all private sector submissions and selects the most 
appropriate offer to compete with the originating agency’s “in-house” offer.  The 
originating agency develops a Government Management Plan (GMP) as the in-house 
offer and submits it for review to an Independent Review Official (IRO).  The IRO 
assures that the GMP is reasonable and meets the requirements of the PWS and QASP.  
(OSD, Share A-76!)   
The private sector and in-house originating agency offers are compared in the cost 
comparison phase.  The private sector offer must be less than the in-house offer by 10% 
or 10 million dollars, whichever is lower, for the activity to be awarded to the private 
sector.  (OSD, Share A-76!)  A preliminary decision is promulgated and an appeals 
process is begun where either party can appeal the preliminary finding.  After the appeals 
are exhausted a final decision is made and implementation of the GMP or conversion to 
private sector begins.   
It is evident, as demonstrated by this brief summary of the A-76 mandated 
outsourcing process, the Office of Management and Budget is very through in explaining 
how to go about outsourcing an activity deemed commercial in nature.  The problem is 
that the government’s instruction on outsourcing does not address risks associated with 
conversion to the private sector.  It is these risks that will be discussed further in an effort 
to inform decision makers and make the ever popular outsourcing movement a successful 
































Figure 9.   A-76 Outsourcing Process Map 
 
C. BUSINESS ISSUES ARISING FROM OUTSOURCING 
Outsourcing is not a new business concept.  After identifying a core competency, 
many private-sector firms have outsourced non-core functions to acquire innovation from 
functional specialists, free management time, and free working capital for other 
investments.  Human resources, payroll, shipping, printing and information technology 
have been popular outsourcing targets.  In its implementation, outsourcing is 
fundamentally a classic make-buy decision.  But outsourcing is not without risk, 
especially when the firm is focused primarily on short-term cost avoidance.  For example, 
managing an outsourced function can be more challenging and more costly than 
performing the function in-house.  Capable contractors can also develop substantial 
supplier power over the firm.  In fact, recent studies suggest that only about 5% of firms 
achieve their outsourcing objectives and that most, like the Department of Defense, 
express their objectives only in terms of short-term cost-savings or manpower reductions.   
Thus, the decision to outsource must be based not only on short-term cost avoidance, but 
also on a strategic assessment of how outsourcing will provide a long-term competitive 
advantage to the firm.  (Lonsdale, p.21) 
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1. Strategic Risks 
A recurring theme in business literature is that outsourcing is a strategic decision.  
However, many firms make outsourcing decisions using only operational analyses.  For 
example, the decision to terminate an in-house print shop in favor of a contract with the 
local printer would typically involve a comparison of in-house costs with the annual 
contract fee.  But this analysis falls short of capturing all of the strategic business risks 
inherent in the decision.  Perhaps, for example, the quality and timeliness of printed 
material differentiates the firm’s services from competitors.  Perhaps the in-house print 
shop routinely performs “expedited” orders that would be very expensive using a 
contractor.  The following section introduces several categories of strategic risks that 
should be considered when analyzing outsourcing alternatives.   
First, a strategic assessment of outsourcing alternatives should begin with 
identification of the core functions that differentiate the firm.  The firm must maintain 
control of these functions to remain competitive into the future.  Since the core functions 
of a firm may change over time, the firm must forecast the dynamics of the business 
cycle in their industry and avoid outsourcing either current or future core competencies.   
The challenge of identifying core competency is evident in a concern as large as 
DoD, which uses the term “inherently governmental” to describe functions as core.  As 
discussed above, the test of “inherently governmental” in OMB Circular A-76 is simply 
whether the current function is intimately related to the public interest enough to require 
performance by government personnel.  But this test falls short of identifying functions 
central to the agency’s current mission capability and certainly does not imply a rigorous, 
iterative assessment of outsourcing decisions with respect to future mission requirements.  
For example, the U.S. Army reduced manpower cost by the late 1990s by moving all civil 
affairs billets to the Reserve and National Guard, in part because the political-military 
duties associated with “nation-building” were not considered “core” in places like 
Kosovo and Somalia.  However, nation-building is proving a vital coalition function in 
the Global War on Terrorism and Army civil affairs battalions have been mobilized for 
duty in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.  This example suggests that outsourcing 
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decisions should be made at a high level in the organization and should be informed by 
the strategic planning considerations discussed in Chapter III.   
A shift of strategic focus to core competency requires abandonment of the 
traditional cost-focus of many strategic assessments.  A cost-focused outsourcing 
assessment will generally target poorly performing, “high cost” units, even if they 
provide a core function of the firm.  Interim cost cutting measures will further erode 
performance and make the struggling unit appear even less favorable during strategic 
sourcing.  Although management may be vindicated in the short-run by initial cost 
savings from outsourcing, the firm will reallocate fixed overhead costs among the 
remaining units and suffer increased supplier power.  These factors will combine to make 
other units appear less favorable during the next strategic assessment and perpetuate an 
outsourcing “death spiral” that results when the firm fails to identify and invest in its core 
competency.  (Bettis)   
Second, firms must also consider strategic flexibility during outsourcing 
assessments.  For each individual function, the firm could likely find a specialist that 
would be more economically efficient.  But the benefits of outsourcing reach a tipping 
point when the firm all but eliminates the possibility of a system-wide innovation.  An 
excessively outsourced firm engages merely in the coordination of a diverse and often 
inefficient array of independent suppliers.  Opportunities for cross-functional 
communication and synergy are lost.  For example, combat logistics services in Iraq are 
performed almost exclusively by large contractors with impressive economies of scale.  
However, these support contracts represent a decision by DoD to forego the strategic and 
operational flexibility of maintaining indigenous capability.  Firms should engage in 
comprehensive strategic evaluation of all past and current outsourcing initiatives rather 
than just the incremental benefits of the next potential outsourcing alternative.   
Third, the firm should consider the impacts of its outsourcing decisions on the 
entire value chain and recognize that many decisions are irrevocable.  We have already 
suggested that outsourcing increases supplier power over the firm.  This is especially true 
in industries with few suppliers that provide unique services.  A firm that sources a 
function removes itself from the value chain as a supplier of that function.  The result in 
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specialized industries could be a de facto value chain integration in which the remaining 
suppliers can dictate unfavorable terms to the firm.  For example, DoD has retained only 
nominal indigenous capacity for contingency construction and logistics support.  A much 
publicized consequence is that DoD contracted for such services in Iraq with Halliburton 
subsidiary KBR as one of the only responsive, responsible sources.  In view of the re-
capitalization challenge outlined above, a future DoD decision to reconstitute indigenous 
construction and logistics capability would be financially infeasible.  The enormous 
manpower, training and capital expenses that would be required make the decision to 
outsource nearly irrevocable.   
2. Operational Risks 
In addition to the three categories of strategic risk discussed above, outsourcing 
introduces a number of operational risks that are sometimes omitted from analysis of 
alternatives.  These risks emerge not from the decision of whether to source a function, 
but the decision of how the function will be sourced.   
First, the nature of the supplier relationship introduces risk.  The firm must choose 
a supplier relationship appropriate to the nature of the function.  An inappropriate or 
poorly worded contract could expose the firm to unreasonable risk of interrupted service, 
poor quality service, or cost growth.  Most firms hire or consult with acquisition 
professionals in the preparation of contract language, but the firm must understand the 
nature of incentives implicit in the various contract types.  For example, a fixed-price 
contract might be appropriate for a well-defined, routine, or recurring service.  However, 
a fixed price might be inappropriate for a developmental product or unique service for 
which the costs are not well understood.  In an inflationary environment, such a contract 
would provide incentive for a contractor to cut corners since it could not recover cost 
growth from the firm through price increases.  In general, the contract should allow the 
firm to maintain sufficient control of the supplier, but allow both the firm and supplier 
reasonable flexibility to adjust the nature of the relationship as circumstances change.  At 
a minimum, the contract should clearly state service levels and measurements, penalties 
for non-performance, growth and inflation rates, and termination provisions.  (Lonsdale, 
p.146) 
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A further consideration is the length of the supplier relationship.  The growth and 
inflation estimates mentioned above become less reliable in longer duration contracts.  
Such contracts also commit the firm to its current decision even though the factors 
influencing the decision may change significantly during execution of the contract.  
Firms must weigh any cost-savings from long contracts against the loss of flexibility 
implicit in multi-year arrangements.  One compromise is a base contract with option 
periods that enable both the firm and supplier to review the relationship periodically and 
consider other alternatives.   
Second, the nature of supplier support introduces risk.  The firm must allocate 
sufficient resources to effectively manage the supplier relationship.  This may require 
personnel specializing in requirements generation, estimating, contracting, quality 
assurance, and contract law.  The firm may be required to provide resources directly to 
the supplier including office, lab or warehouse space, equipment, data or liaison 
personnel.  Although all of these requirements should have been included in the sourcing 
decision, any attempt to further reduce cost in these areas could be disastrous.  
Interrupted or poor quality supply could cripple the firm, especially if the function 
outsourced was a core or "near-core" competency.  These contract support costs are a 
significant part of the reason that only about 30% of original DoD program costs are 
recovered when a function is outsourced.   
Third, the nature of performance measurement introduces risk.  The firm must be 
able to measure supplier performance against an objective standard expressed in terms of 
the impact of the supplier on the business.  (Lonsdale, p. 151)  Research suggests that 
supplier performance peaks at contract initiation and in anticipation of contract renewal.  
Thorough performance measurement, especially when coupled with financial 
performance incentives, can maintain a more consistent level of service for the firm.  
Performance measurement can also provide the firm an early warning of contractor 
failure before any damaging impact to the firm’s business.  Motivation theory suggests 
attributing a small number of objective measures to specific individuals who will suffer 
explicit consequences at various thresholds of performance.  However, DoD is 
increasingly moving toward performance-based specifications with subjective, outcome-
 55
oriented performance measures.  Although these measures tend to capture the overall 
performance of the supplier in various periods, they may not provide sufficient warning 
to the government that supplier failure is imminent.  This is especially risky when the 
consequence of interrupted supply is a loss of mission capability.   
Fourth, the nature of the product or service introduces risk.  After a strategic 
decision to outsource, the firm must further refine areas of operational risk inherent in the 
sourced function.  Perhaps the contractor will now interface with the firm’s customers.  
Perhaps the firm imposes such restrictive constraints and deadlines on performance that 
quality will suffer or premium fees will be required.  In the worst case, the function is so 
unique or complex that the supplier may simply be unable to perform.   
The largest government outsourcing initiative in history for a single function is 
the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).  NMCI is a loosely defined, $8.8B 
performance contract awarded to Electronic Data Services (EDS), which calls for the 
contractor to assume responsibility for over 360,000 computer workstations.  In June 
2003, rumors circulated that EDS would attempt to terminate its contract after 
announcing a $334M quarterly loss on the project.  (French)  EDS has continued to 
perform, but concerns about the quality of service and long-term solvency of the 
company linger.   
Although information technology (IT) outsourcing is increasingly common 
among large firms, both the government and EDS underestimated the enormous scope 
and complexity of the NMCI initiative.  Part of the problem for EDS is that the 
government initially requested hardware configured for individual users.  Since Navy and 
Marine Corps personnel rotate so frequently, EDS often delivered workstations 
customized for users who had already transferred.  The government responded by 
specifying a standardized workstation configuration, but then grossly underestimated the 
number of legacy software applications that the NMCI platform would need to support.  
Users became frustrated by the contractor’s pace of implementation and level of customer 
service.  In both instances, a setback occurred due to a performance risk inherent in the 
nature of the service.   
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3. Cost-Benefit Considerations 
The strategic and operational risks discussed above highlight the need for careful 
and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of all outsourcing opportunities.  Whereas 
“benefit” is usually expressed as a relative cost reduction from outsourcing compared to 
in-house operations, “cost” is far less tangible.  Short-run quantifiable expenses like 
consultant fees and contract administration fees usually appear in the analysis, but “costs” 
may also include the long-run competitive viability of the firm if the core competency is 
inadvertently outsourced.  Costs may also include increased supplier power, structural 
change of the value chain, and loss of strategic flexibility.  For these reasons, cost-benefit 
analysis of outsourcing alternatives should be done at the strategic level of the 
organization and should follow a robust and iterative methodology.  (Lonsdale, p. 165) 
We noted that outsourcing benefit is often easier to capture than cost.  But 
outsourcing decisions are sometimes influenced by many perceived benefits that do not 
reflect in the analysis.  For example, some private-sector firms have used outsourcing to 
solve problems that they were unable or unwilling to solve themselves, even though these 
problems were occurring in a function central to the firm’s operations.  A more 
appropriate solution would have been to devote the management time necessary to 
control the function internally.  Also, some firms outsource in the hope of achieving 
future benefit from the growth and innovation of the supplier.  This is especially true in 
the area of enterprise resource planning where large IT firms provide comprehensive 
software packages that integrate and manage all standard business functions such as 
human resources, accounting, and billing.  These suppliers promise untold efficiencies 
from system-wide integration, but often charge a very large premium to customize the 
standard software for a particular industry or firm.  In the end, the best enterprise 
software can not substitute for the knowledge, skill and intuition of management.  These 
systems only provide management with better information and perhaps some more free 
time to make decisions.   
As the firm, industry and environmental factors change over time, the firm must 
continually re-evaluate the cost-benefit analysis of prior outsourcing decisions.  The 
dusty analysis from the original decision is not applicable to future reviews since there 
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maybe a new supplier offering a different package of services.  Perhaps the labor market 
for a particular trade has changed significantly or new technology has made in-house 
operation feasible again.  We may consider document processing for example.  Many 
large firms outsourced document processing before the advent of desktop publishing and 
multi-function office machines that can perform many of the complex printing, binding 
and mailing services provided by commercial printers.  Such firms should now be 
engaged in routine “insourcing” analysis to determine when it may be appropriate to 
purchase new equipment and terminate service contracts.  Such reviews need not 
correspond with the contract renewal period, but fees for early termination fees in the 
contract often influence the analysis significantly.   
A common theme in business literature is that cost-benefit analysis of outsourcing 
alternatives should follow a long-term, strategic methodology and be formalized in a 
standing policy. (Lonsdale, p. 165)  DoD uses OMB Circular A-76 as its outsourcing 
policy.  As discussed above, A-76 provides a helpful framework for classifying functions 
and obtaining market information.  However, one consequence appears to be a thrust to 
outsource all “commercial” functions that can be performed more cheaply by the private 
sector.  This approach ignores many of the risks listed above and does not constitute a 
robust strategic positioning of DoD with respect to current and future mission 
requirements.  The A-76 methodology has such a strong emphasis on cost avoidance that 
few would propose a more costly in-house alternative to outsourcing, even though it may 
provide greater long-term strategic benefit.   
Outsourcing analysis should incorporate the lessons learned in the acquisition 
community that “best value” is generally better for the government than “lowest cost.”  In 
the next section we look more extensively at DoD outsourcing and review some of the 
costs, benefits, risks and lessons learned from the DoD implementation.   
D. DOD OUTSOURCING IMPLEMENTATION 
All government agencies have an obligation to U.S. taxpayers to manage scarce 
resources effectively.  Congress and the public entrust DoD to develop managerial and 
financial efficiencies while avoiding instances of waste, fraud or abuse in the execution 
of public funds.  About 60% of DoD annual obligation authority is consumed by support 
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infrastructure costs, of which personnel account for nearly half of the total.  (Gates and 
Robbert, p. 1)  In order to maintain combat effectiveness and support operational 
requirements, these infrastructure costs are an enticing source of potentially large 
savings.  Competitive sourcing is increasingly viewed as a way to generate efficiencies, 
reduce overhead costs and capture savings.   
Competitive sourcing is a process through which government agencies consider 
proposals from both private businesses and agency employees to determine who can 
provide a given level of service at the lowest cost.  Competitive sourcing differs from 
outsourcing in a fundamental way: it allows both external and internal suppliers to 
compete to provide services, whereas outsourcing looks only to external suppliers in 
search of better value.  As addressed above, OMB Circular A-76 spells out the rules and 
procedures government managers must follow when they solicit competitive sources.  
Recent government experience has also yielded several “best practices” for achieving 
competitive sourcing goals, which include:  demonstrate active support of agency leaders; 
employ proactive, strategic thinking; encourage creativity and a long term outlook; use 
centralized management with decentralized execution; group together functions for 
competition to achieve economies of scale; seek outside assistance from independent 
sources; develop innovative management tools to monitor and gauge success, such as an 
internal scorecard and time limits on decisions.  (Dumas and Stephens) 
One of the main benefits of competitive sourcing is that government agencies are 
compelled through competition to identify the most efficient organization (MEO) capable 
of delivering the required services.  Cost savings are often achieved prior to outsourcing 
when an agency identifies and eliminates inefficiencies with the traditional way of doing 
business.  For example, the Office of Management and Budget concluded that the only 
way to reduce the cost of printing the fiscal 2004 federal budget was to competitively 
source the service traditionally provided by the Government Printing Office (GPO).  
Forced by competition to evaluate their operations and improve efficiencies, GPO 
reduced costs and submitted a bid that was 24 percent less than what they had charged for 
printing the fiscal 2003 federal budget, a savings of nearly $100,000.  (Segal and Moore) 
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E. DOD OUTSOURCING CHALLENGES 
Despite the opportunity for additional savings represented by the GPO example 
and the “best practices” noted above, DoD has encountered several of the same 
outsourcing challenges experienced by private industry.   
First, DoD has not fully implemented a comprehensive, strategic, iterative 
outsourcing methodology as suggested by private-sector experience.  Although A-76 
provides both policy and procedure for competitive sourcing, President Bush suggests in 
The President's Management Agenda for 2002 that some agencies have shielded 
themselves from competition by not aggressively subjecting all non-governmental 
functions to competitive sourcing:   
Nearly half of all federal employees perform tasks that are readily 
available in the commercial marketplace—tasks like data collection, 
administrative support, and payroll services. Historically, the government 
has realized cost savings in a range of 20 to 50 percent when federal and 
private sector service providers compete to perform these functions.  
Unfortunately, competition between public and private sources remains an 
unfulfilled management promise.  By rarely subjecting commercial tasks 
performed by the government to competition, agencies have insulated 
themselves from the pressures that produce quality service at reasonable 
cost.  (PMA, 2002) 
Second, DoD has focused almost exclusively on cost avoidance in the 
implementation of A-76 and has not necessarily considered a “best value” approach to 
competitive sourcing.  For example, GAO noted that A-76 has not worked well as the 
basis for competitions that seek to identify the best provider in terms of quality, 
innovation, flexibility, and reliability.  (GAO, Jun 26 2002, p. 9) 
Third, DoD has been challenged to identify and assess current costs since many 
agencies do not maintain adequate financial records of work performed in-house.  The 
performance work statement (PWS) that is generated for competition with the private 
sector often understates or omits costs that are not realized until after the sourcing 
decision.  Other errors are made in the assessment of governmental functions due to the 
assignment of inexperienced or untrained personnel to perform the cost analysis.  Further,  
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agencies have often required three to four years to even define the jobs being considered 
for competition.  Finally, agencies lack sufficient data to determine accurate post-award 
or MEO cost savings.   
Fourth, DoD does not always capture the investment costs associated with 
performing the competitive analysis and transitioning to either MEO or contract.  When 
an agency does not include all A-76 costs in their projections, critical shortfalls will not 
be reflected in the DOD savings calculations and will require local funding to cover 
additional costs.  Total sourcing costs often include:  training of government personnel 
involved in the A-76 process; production of study documents (e.g., PWS, MEO, etc.) by 
government employees with contractor support; source selection and evaluation board 
costs (salary of government employees evaluating contractor and government proposals); 
independent review of government documents; lost productivity (redistribution of work 
normally done by employees directly or indirectly involved in the study); transition costs 
(employee workshops, job fairs, additional administrative support to affected employees, 
management of potentially adverse employee impacts, and transition training); contractor 
phase-in (overlapped expenses associated with loss of government workers prior to 
contract start date); voluntary separation (incentive payments to reduce effects of 
reductions in force); severance pay; priority placement program (entitlement expenses for 
displaced employees gaining employment outside the commuting area).  (Fritz) 
Finally, DoD has not always performed rigorous strategic risk assessment of 
competitive sourcing alternatives.  As with private industry, all government outsourcing 
decisions involve risk and tradeoffs.  For each tradeoff there is an incremental degree of 
risk that the decision maker accepts.  Two of the more substantial risks in government 
sourcing decisions are control risk and performance risk.   
Control risk arises when the agency head sacrifices a degree of control during 
outsourcing and is instead bounded by the terms of a contract.  When uniformed 
personnel are replaced, a commander no longer has authority to adjust schedules or 
requirements unless those changes are specifically addressed in the contract.  This loss of 
control is even more significant when the actions of contractors risk bringing discredit to 
the government.  For example, Titan and CACI International Inc., a Lockheed subsidiary, 
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provided civilian interrogators at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad in 2004 to 
augment indigenous military capabilities.  The role of civilian interrogators and the chain 
of accountability at the prison have brought the issue of strategic outsourcing risk into 
sharp focus.   
As in private industry, performance risk arises whenever a government function is 
outsourced.  The successful bidder may fail to fulfill all contract requirements, incur 
substantial cost growth, or even go out of business.  These risks are mitigated by 
carefully assessing market conditions and conducting a thorough pre-award survey to 
include examination of past performance, financial reports, supplier references, and the 
resumes of key management personnel.  Cost overruns are further minimized by rejecting 
unreasonably low bids.  (Segal and Moore)  However, even these steps may be 
insufficient when the activity outsourced was a core competency or significant non-core 
function.   
F. SUMMARY OF OUTSOURCING OPTIONS 
In this section we have presented the government’s policy for outsourcing, 
examined the competitive sourcing procedure defined by OMB Circular A-76, reviewed 
the costs, benefits, and risks of outsourcing from the perspective of private-sector firms, 
and summarized government implementation of competitive sourcing.  Our study reveals 
that the DoD has made commendable progress implementing the A-76 procedure, but 
must carefully consider the lessons learned from both DoD and private-sector experience.  
Sourcing policy must emphasize the strategic, iterative nature of all make-buy decisions 
and require explicit consideration of both the strategic and operational risks inherent in 
all sourcing decisions.  In order to maximize outsourcing benefit and mitigate unintended 
consequences, DoD should place less exclusive emphasis on cost savings and more 
heavily weigh overall management efficiency and improved business practices.  Long 
term savings can be sustained by carefully selecting the most appropriate supplier 


























A. STUDY SUMMARY 
The initial focus of this study was to define in broad terms the nature and scope of 
potential budget trade-offs that would achieve fleet re-capitalization goals within the 
framework of current Navy missions.  Second, the analysis explored in greater detail a 
Marine Corps manpower rescission that illustrates the significant ramifications of even a 
relatively small budget cut.  Finally, recognizing the inevitability of continued 
outsourcing in DoD, the study evaluated current outsourcing policy and initiatives using 
private-sector risk criteria popularized in the business literature.   
Our study illustrated that defense planning documents call for a modern agile 
force with broadened operational capability to fight the war on terror.  Navy planners 
have translated this vision into a plan to re-capitalize the battle fleet and naval air forces 
over the next two decades.  Subsequently, Navy programmers have outlined the 
procurement milestones necessary to meet the goals established by the plan.  Anticipating 
no significant increase in Navy TOA, the Sea Enterprise team is searching for internal 
efficiencies that may help finance additional procurement.  However, the budget forecasts 
in this study suggest that the re-capitalization milestones are unrealistic unless the Navy 
is prepared to suffer unprecedented cuts in competing programs.   
If Navy TOA indeed remains capped near its current level, the internal trade-offs 
required to finance the desired fleet would cripple the Navy’s ability to operate.  For 
example, if Navy leaders cut MILPERS to finance procurement, then overall end strength 
must be reduced to 40% of the current level by 2008 and just 5% of the current level by 
2009.    If they choose a broader cut across not only MILPERS but also O&M and 
RDT&E, then overall end strength must still be reduced to roughly 65% of the current 
level by 2009 to sustain O&M spending at a rate that would support a fleet on only about 
240 ships.  Further, RDT&E spending in this scenario would probably be insufficient to 
sustain modernization at the required rate to achieve the re-capitalization goal by FY22.   
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As suggested by the Marine Corps rescission example included in our study, the 
road ahead demands aggressive change.  To implement even a relatively small cut to 
MILPERS, Navy leaders must capture not only the short-term savings from things like 
streamlined personnel policy and innovative training methods, but also the long-term 
savings from more fundamental changes like restructuring overseas commands.  But such 
sweeping change bears significant risk of unintended consequences.  Thus, Navy 
leadership is taking a more incremental approach through the use of competitive 
sourcing.   
Unfortunately, our study revealed that outsourcing alone is not a viable solution to 
the procurement financing problem.  Although the savings achieved through outsourcing 
are impressive, they currently amount to only about 1.5% of Navy TOA.  Such marginal 
savings will not significantly mitigate the re-capitalization budget dilemma.  In fact, this 
study framed the budget problem with the assumption that non-procurement functions 
and programs would be eliminated rather than outsourced.  If a capability is outsourced 
rather than eliminated, then fully 70% of the original program cost is retained.   
Nevertheless, competitive sourcing remains a proven approach to generating 
savings that will be implemented throughout the Navy.  Our study of private-sector 
outsourcing suggests that Navy leadership should take a strategic, iterative approach to 
sourcing decisions and balance potential cost savings with the strategic and operational 
risks inherent to any make-buy decision.  The policy guidance in OMB Circular A-76 
could be broadened by incorporating the lessons learned and “best practices” from both 
government and private-sector experience with outsourcing.   
B THE ROAD AHEAD 
Although this study suggested that the programmed re-capitalization is fiscally 
unrealistic, there are several avenues to improve the budget dilemma:   
First, Navy leadership should continually re-examine the procurement milestones 
in the context of the global war on terror.  Perhaps the call for a fleet of 375 ships and 
average aircraft age of 12 years will prove overly ambitious if the war on terror 
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progresses better than expected.  Alternately, the requirement could be spread over a 
longer period than the current target of FY22.   
Second, Navy leadership must continually push the TOA ceiling higher.  Perhaps 
if Congress acts to reduce entitlement spending programs, then more will be available for 
national defense and homeland security.  Navy leadership should use the compelling 
arguments in the defense planning documents and the supplemental appropriations to 
frame the argument for additional TOA baseline to finance procurement spending.   
Third, the transformation initiated by Sea Enterprise must expand to all levels of 
Navy leadership.  Although the marginal cost savings from business process 
transformation may not fully mitigate procurement funding shortfalls, the efficiencies 
realized move the budget steadily in the right direction.  Additional savings from sources 
not considered in this study such as MILCON, Family Housing, BRAC and privatization 
may also contribute.   
Fourth, The Navy must integrate procurement programming with the other 
services to leverage Department of Defense resources and avoid sub-optimizing Navy 
capital assets.  Navy planners and programmers can capture marginal external benefit 
from the procurement programs of other services and defense agencies by demanding 
interoperability of Navy platforms with other weapons systems.  Further, Navy shore 
infrastructure and support functions can be substantially streamlined by emphasizing 
“jointness” in all planning and programming decisions. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Our study suggests several avenues for further research.  First, conduct continued 
analysis of potential budget trade-offs to identify actionable solutions to the looming re-
capitalization crisis.  Second, perform financial analysis of individual cost savings 
initiatives in support of Sea Enterprise to streamline current operations.  Third, contribute 
to the relatively small body of research on government experience with outsourcing.  
Focus particularly on a comprehensive evaluation of long-term results for a particular 
category of sourcing decisions.  Fourth, consider changes to the A-76 competitive 
sourcing procedure that would implement an iterative, strategic-level decision process 
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informed by both the private-sector and government outsourcing experiences.  Fifth, 
evaluate the effectiveness of recent changes to the formal resource allocation process.  
Focus particularly on the degree to which planning and programming decisions are 
fiscally-informed and the degree to which annual budgets present realistic spending 
goals.   
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APPENDIX A 
PROJECTED OUTLAYS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICAID 








Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Social Security Administration, 
The 2002 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (March 26, 2002); and Department of 
Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the 
Actuary, 2002 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance 





























2004 DON BUDGET SUMMARY 






FAMILY HOUSING 1,013 0.8%
OTHER 1,675 1.4%
TOA 120,756
TOA (less MILCON, FH, Other) 116,739
Source: Department of Navy Fiscal Year 2004 Budget
<Dollars in Millions>




































NEW SHIP CONSTRUCTION AND CONVERSIONS PROGRAMMED 
THROUGH 2009 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
New Ship Construction (#) 5 7 8 7 7 9 14
New Construction Costs for 2003-2004 ($) 6,971 8,460
Total-Conversions (#) 2 3 2 2 2 3 3
Other SCN (#) 5 3 10 11 12 11 10
TOTAL SCN (#) 12 13 20 20 21 23 27
TOTAL COST ($) (1) 9,108 11,402 14,600 13,650 14,000 16,600 22,750
2003 2004 Future Est.
Construction Costs per new construction(2) 1,394 1,208 1,300





1.  2003-2004 numbers taken directly from DON budget.  2005-2009 numbers 
computed by multiplying the number of new constructions by the average new 
construction cost of 1,300, plus the number of conversions and other SCN multiplied by 
the average conversion cost of 350.   
2.  Computed by dividing the new construction costs by the number of new 
conversions in the applicable year.  Projected future costs are an estimate of the costs per 
new construction in years 2005-2009.   
3.  These numbers are computed by subtracting the total cost of ship construction 
and conversion from the cost of New construction.  This gives us the cost of conversions 
and other SCN.  We then divide the cost of conversions and other SCN by the number of 
Conversions and other SCN to give us the costs per conversion and other SCN.   
 
Source: Department of Navy Budgets for 2003 and 2004.  2005-2009 cost data 


























NEW AND REMANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT PROGRAMMED THROUGH 
2009 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
New and Remanufactured Aircraft (#) 95 100 100 133 191 258 302
Projected Costs ($) (1) 8,648 8,788 9,000 11,970 17,190 23,220 27,180
2003 2004 Future Est.






1.  2005-2009 projections computed by multiplying the number of new 
procurement and remanufactured aircraft programs in the applicable year by the projected 
future procurement and remanufactured programs cost of $90M.   
2.  Computed by dividing the projected costs by the number of new procurement 
and remanufactured programs in the applicable year.  Projected future costs are an 
estimate of the costs per new procurement and remanufactured programs in years 2005-
2009.   
 
Source:  Department of Navy Budgets for 2003 and 2004.  2005-2009 cost data 











































































SUMMARY DON BUDGET DATA FOR FY2000-2004 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Procurement 23,526 26,607 24,517 27,451 29,823
RDT&E 9,065 9,596 11,379 13,700 14,970
O&M 27,322 29,523 32,403 42,537 35,579
MILPERS 25,608 26,966 30,012 36,183 36,367
Total 85,521 92,692 98,311 119,871 116,739
End Strength (1) 673,114 678,467 684,704 689,216 674,300
Number of Ships 318 316 313 296 292
Future
Category Unit Costs Estimate
MILPERS Unit Cost ($/person) (2) 38,044 39,745 43,832 52,499 53,933 54,000
O&M Unit Cost ($M/ship in fleet) (3) 86 93 104 144 122 100
Annual Percentage of non-Procurement Spending by Category (4)
RDT&E 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16
O&M 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.41 0.44






1.  End Strength includes Navy, Marine Corps, NR and MCR. 
2.  Personnel unit cost.  MILPERS total divided by end strength.  Future cost 
estimate selected for forecasting.   
3.  O&M unit cost.  O&M total divided by fleet size.  Future cost estimate 
selected for forecasting.   
4.  Annual category spending divided by difference of total spending and 
procurement.  Future category ratios selected for forecasting.   
 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RE-CAPITALIZATION BUDGET FORECAST - HORIZONTAL CUT OF 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PROJECTED SAVINGS FROM COMPETITIVE OUTSOURCING 
2003 2004 2005
Navy 1,001 1,479 1,642
Marine Corps 88 105 105
Total 1,089 1,584 1,747
Navy TOA 119,871 116,739 116,739
% of TOA 0.91% 1.36% 1.50%
Source: United States.  Executive Office of the President.  “Big Savings Expected from 
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